Arguments for Multiculturalism: An Evaluation

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Abstract:
Almost all countries around the world face problems managing differences in their public sphere. Given the multiculturality of the majority of contemporary societies, this management takes two routes; either the differences are confined into the private sphere and there is an insistence on ways the society can be kept united, or the differences are brought into the public sphere, and the society is then made up of groups, each fighting for its recognition. Multiculturalism takes the second route and advances two arguments: the claim for authenticity and the claim for recognition. This paper evaluates the consistency of these arguments with the sustainability of the State. We argue that the arguments advanced by multiculturalism are not convincing and rather lead to the fragmentation of the state. Finally, we sketch the type of education that can help to handle the question of differences without turning individuals and groups into islands.

INTRODUCTION

It is not easy at first to see the value of a paper whose main concern is a debate about differences for it seems obvious that things are never the same. Even for two gadgets coming from a factory, it is obvious that they are not the same. If you say for instance that two phones from the same series are the same, you mean by 'same' nothing but their having the same functions and characteristics, not that they are the same as if "having two phones" and "having one phone" are synonymous. As Leibniz puts it, "in nature, there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination]." (Leibniz, 1898 : §9) When two things are not the same, they are said to be different. By difference, we, therefore, mean that which makes something or a person not being confused with another or taken for something else. We draw the attention here on the necessity of openness. But if the difference is so obvious, why is it that one still finds it important to talk about it?

One will notice that differences always impose upon us, in such a way that goes beyond them becomes a great effort, often against our desire or natural tendency for discrimination. But we can also notice that differences are always considered in relation with the same -generally, the definition of difference is given in a negative way: two things are different if they are not the same-. Leibniz again affirms:

> This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit or in that which is simple. For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts. (Ibid.:§13)

The management of differences within the public sphere is at the core of multiculturalism, and this is the main reason why that doctrine is the focus of this paper. Multiculturalism is the doctrine that advocates the sacralization of groups' differences –at least in its maximalist conception. (Semprini, 1997:100) According to this definition of multiculturalism, State authorities behave properly only by insisting on differences of the various cultural constituents of the said State. Against this view of multiculturalism, we will argue in this paper that taken in this sense; multiculturalism will rather lead to the fragmentation and further to the non-existence of the State.

In the spirit of an evaluation, we present the main arguments for multiculturalism (§2), then we reveal some flaws in these arguments, showing how multiculturalism challenges the unity of the State (§3) and we end up proposing a way of overcoming the difficulty (§4). Since it is vital to identify our target clearly, we start (§1) with a brief description of multiculturalism and make the distinction between multiculturalism and multiculturality to which it is often confused.

1. MULTICULTURALISM , A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

1.1.   Multiculturalism in General

1.1.1.   The different meanings of multiculturalism

Wievorka (1998) and Semprini (1997) explain that multiculturalism should be understood in more than one way.

Michel Wievorka explains first that there are three uses or the term multiculturalism: the descriptive, the normative and the political. The descriptive use focuses on the presentation of our societies as made up of differences. The normative use presents the consideration of these differences as what should guide the policy of a multicultural society. And the political use shows different measures put in place by governments to accept differences and promote the peaceful cohabitation of such groups of people or minorities. However, Wievorka seems not to be satisfied by such a classification and suggest to see multiculturalism from two points of view, the point of view of those who consider it as a problem –a society is multicultural if it is aware of and accept the differences that constitute its parts- and the point of view of those who consider it as a solution-a society is multicultural if the state promote acts that permit to some marginalized groups to catch up their lateness on other groups-.

Andrea Semprini, in turn, suggests that multicultural thinkers should be read from two points of view: the political point of view -those who see multiculturalism as a policy- and the cultural point of view -those who see it as a cultural problem.

The political reading of multiculturalism will focus on claims of ethnic or religious minorities to obtain political or administrative consideration in the state. This can be traduced by a distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups. In turn, the cultural reading will focus on the claims of groups that are not necessarily homogenous, either from an ethnic or religious point of view. This second reading is mostly concerned with social movements whereby people feel a certain identity or share some values that need, or they think should be recognized. Such social movements may be issues concerning gays' and lesbians' rights as well as issues of feminism.

1.1.2.   Different forms of multiculturalism

Also, multiculturalism takes different forms as gathered by Semprini in her work cited earlier (Cf. Semprini, 1997: 97-103). For the sake of space and having only our critique of multiculturalism in view, we shall only discuss three of these forms of multiculturalism.

The **liberal society conception** of multiculturalism focuses on the distinction, at the individual level, between private and public rights. By private rights, are meant things that an individual is allowed to do, but that is not considered as compulsory for everybody. For example, if somebody believes to a God, it is right. It does not, however, mean that everybody should believe to the same God. The issue of beliefs is therefore confined in the private sphere. One should notice that such societies do not necessarily claim to be multicultural. They are multicultural implicitly, by the recognition of differences among their members. Charles Taylor's Multiculturalism can be seen as a good interpretation of such a conception since the author insists on the rights of individuals and their relation to national citizenship.

The **ethnic conception** of multiculturalism has a core idea that some groups in the society constitute minorities and should be protected. In the case of Cameroon, one may say that since 'Pygmees' for example are native of the South region, they must be accorded special rights, despite the different migrations in the region. Here, a difference is clearly made between natives and non-natives. This poses the problem of knowing which rights should be accorded to native ethnics of a locality and groups that are found thereafter migrations. Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship constitutes a good introduction to such a conception of multiculturalism. The difference with the classical liberal society is clear. When classical liberal societies put emphasis on the distinction between the private and the public sphere, the multicultural society focuses on the distinction between rights caf natives and rights of foreigners. When the ethnic conception reaches its paroxysm, and there are claims for regional autonomy or secession, we are led to the **maximalist conception** of multiculturalism.

From what we have seen, multiculturalism seems not to be a homogeneous reality and should better be considered from a dialectic point of view, problem/ solution. We will not go into that debate now; there is another important distinction to be made.

1.2.   Multiculturalism and multiculturality

Multiculturalism and multiculturality are very similar from their nominal composition, and this nominal similarity may lead to semantic confusion. It is, however, a vital task if one wants to understand our argument, to establish a clear difference between them.

1.2.1. Multiculturalism

From its structure, of the word multiculturalism is made up of three components namely 'multi' (many), 'cultural' (belonging to a particular culture) and 'ism' (showing that it is doctrine). From these three components, multiculturalism can be defined as the doctrine advocating that the cultural values of the different components of a society must have a central influence on that society as a whole, as well as on the behavior of its citizens. The above understanding of culturalism makes sense since the word 'cultural' shows that something is related to a particular culture or society and its way of life. This is the case when we say for instance that spicy meals are cultural to Mexicans, meaning that it is almost impossible to see a Mexican who will not like his meal with a lot of spices. Likewise, the following expressions: 'cultural differences,' 'cultural background,' 'cultural identity' and 'cultural context' all refer to the idea of paying due attention to the particularity of a given culture or group.

1.2.2. Multiculturality

From its structure too, multiculturality is made up of three components: 'multi' (many), 'cultural' (belonging to culture) and 'city' (showing that it is quality). From their structures, there is only a slight difference; the "is" has changed to the "city." But this difference that appears to be slight at first glance is really important if one recalls what doctrine is, a set of dogma that guides some one's behavior. Being a doctrine, multiculturalism bears the idea that it is from their differences that its proponents identify themselves in the society; it is their differences that guide their behavior. So, though their structures are almost the same, one should avoid doing confusion between multiculturalism and multiculturality since the former qualifies the way different cultures think their particularity should be promoted in the society while the latter only shows the presence of many cultures within the same society.

The target of our discussion in this paper is not multiculturality whose evidence is hardly debatable, but a multiculturalism whose challenge to the unity of a State cannot be ignored.

2. ARGUMENTS FOR MULTICULTURALISM

Having clearly identified our target, let's now turn to the main arguments in favor of multiculturalism: the claim for authenticity and the claim for recognition.

2.1.   First argument: we need not be like others, let's be authentic

This issue of differences among people is often viewed as a fight against assimilation, meaning by assimilation the act of making things look the same. All multicultural theories focus on that point that may be translated by the following maxim: be who you are and don't be ashamed of being different from others. This quest may be expressed at the individual, ethnic or national levels. But no matter the level, they are always questions of identity and authenticity.

The issue of identity as it is tackled by multiculturalist thinkers gathers the elements in the fields of logic, ontology, and philosophy of mind. It appeared in the half of the twentieth century as a matter which is today named 'Identity politics.' By Identity politics, is meant a wide range of political activities and theorizing rooted in the shared experiences of injustice by members of certain social groups (Heyes, 2002). However, we will see that instead of focusing on group identity, identity, as seen by multiculturalists, centers on the singularity of individuals in a given society, on their authenticity.

Charles Taylor's Multiculturalism can be seen as an illustration of the impact of the question of identity, at the individual level in multicultural debates. In his work, the concepts of identity and authenticity are closely related. As Taylor puts it,

> This latter term [identity] designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. (Taylor in Gutmann, 1994:25)

Further, he goes deep and affirms the following:

> We might speak of an individualized identity, one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself. This notion arises along with an ideal, that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being. Following Lionel Trilling's usage in his brilliant study, I will speak of this as the ideal of "authenticity." (Ibid.: 28)

From this definition, identity can be seen from two points of view, either as singleness over time or as sameness amid difference. But both points of view remain the same since identifying something as the same over time cannot be separated from distinguishing one thing from others. What one should retain at this point is that, for multiculturalists, the individual authenticity serves as the basis for the constitution of the collective identity. It is because individuals are recognized as worthy that groups to which they belong can also be presented as worthy since individuals are naturally part of a community (Cf. Habermas, in Gutmann, 1994:129). And the group is the extension of the individual, the authenticity, and identity claimed by individuals should also be granted to groups.

2.2.   The second argument: We need not hide our differences, let's fight for our recognition

The term recognition can be defined as the expectation an individual or a group has vis-à-vis other individuals, other groups or the government of the country and even beyond, to be treated as fairly as possible with respect either to his actual position in the society, his historical background or other factors. The term has been fundamental in the birth of the multiculturalist movement. Tracing the origin of the multicultural movement, Will Kymlicka says:

> From the 1970s to mid-1990s, there was a clear trend across Western democracies toward the increased recognition and accommodation of diversity through a range of multiculturalism policies (MCPs) and minority rights. These policies were endorsed both at the domestic level in some states and by international organizations and involved a rejection of earlier ideas of unitary and homogeneous nationhood. (Kymlicka, 2012:3)

One can notice that the first point at which the question of recognition matters for multiculturalists is at the societal or macroscopic level. Each society should recognize that it is made up of differences. Just to indicate, this point is controversial since as we have seen above, the recognition of the identity of individuals gives them a sort of equal value in the society considered. Otherwise, one should be forced to distinguish between superior and low-class citizens, between important and less important groups in the society and other distinctions in the same line.

Groups are formed from individual identities, and they also have their own characteristics. One may talk about collective identity. However, as far as groups are concerned, the word recognition is mostly used. Usually, in multicultural societies, different groups struggle for the recognition of their specificities as groups and most often ask for particular treatments due to historical factors. Let us take an example. The 'Anglophone' inhabitants of Cameroon consider themselves as minorities and therefore claim that they deserve particular treatments for their integration in the larger francophone part of the country.

This brings in the idea that the use of the term recognition in multiculturalism indeed shows that there is always an opposition between a majority and a minority. This includes, among others, the oppositions: individual-group, the ethnic minority-ethnic majority, immigrants-natives, small regions-big regions. Accordingly, this suggests that different types of minorities struggle for different forms of multicultural citizenship that combine both antidiscrimination measures and positive forms of recognition and accommodation. For example, while individuals will be struggling for the recognition of their authenticity as individuals, immigrants will be looking for protection, minority ethnics for special rights and small regions for the respect of their sovereignty. All this has consequences not only for the theoretical stability of multiculturalism but also on the unity of the State and harmony within the public sphere.

The above analysis suggests that multiculturalism, for it emphasizes on differences instead of unity, can lead to the fragmentation of the state. It is an exploration of this point that we are going to deepen in the next point.

3.   THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM TO THE UNITY OF THE STATE

In the preceding sections, we have made a general presentation of multiculturalism and have seen its main arguments. We are now going to outline some defects of this doctrine. Going from a critique of the theoretical roots of multiculturalism in §3.1, we show the incoherence of the ideas of multiculturalism and State in §3.2 before we conclude in §3.3 with an example, the multicultural policy as it is applied in Cameroon.

3.1.   Theoretical Weaknesses of Multiculturalism

By theoretical, we mean that which is related to the theory. By theory, we mean that which is present in mind, purports to exist out of mind, practically but does not yet exist, practically, as such. By what is in mind, we mean the idea of a thing or how one understands it. By theoretical weakness of multiculturalism, we, therefore, understand the untenability of the idea that differences are sacred and should never be overcome.

The idea of multiculturalism in untenable because it confuses between anarchy and order. By anarchy, we mean the loose of a guiding principle within a given group, in such a way that anyone could claim to follow his own way. By order, we mean the direction towards a guiding principle by which people are sure to attain the same goal, -the unity of the country for instance-. In fact when multiculturalists essentialize differences, one might wonder if by doing so, they mean that anyone should follow his own goal in the society or if any group should follow his own way of behaving within the public sphere. Giving a kind of anarchical interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, a renowned multiculturalist like Tariq Modood affirms:

> The second key point I draw from Wittgenstein is that theorists should be wary of reading philosophical errors into non-theoretical activities. If we, as non-philosophers, can understand what languages or games are (or, to cite some of Wittgenstein's examples: knowledge, mind, memory, time), we can successfully operate in the world – play the appropriate 'language-game' – without positing essences or indeed philosophical theories. (Modood, 2013:88-89)

A genuine multiculturalist could temper our resistance by saying that multiculturalism applies to groups, that it is, in the words of Will Kymlicka, a set of 'group-differentiated' policies. If this counter-objection holds, if multiculturalism is said to be applied at the level of groups, each pursuing its own way and values, it leads to the maximalist/ secessionist conception of multiculturalism.

If this counter-objection does not hold, if multiculturalism is said to be applied at the level of individuals as Taylor as evoked, then multiculturalism mixes up with liberalism. In one case as in the other, multiculturalism essentializes differences, either at the level of the individual or at the level of groups. If it is at the level of individuals, we are led to the fragmentation of the country from the first degree –as much as each individual decides for his own sake- and if it is at the level of groups we are led to the fragmentation of the country from the second degree –as much as each group moves in its own directions. Whatever is the case, multiculturalism leads us to the fragmentation of the country, even if it is granted at the first degree of fragmentation that the critique might also be addressed to liberalism, but criticizing multiculturalism is not necessarily as some may think, living the room to liberalism. (On multiculturalism borrowing to liberalism, see Kymlicka, 1995:6)

The argument just developed could better be understood if one makes a comparative analysis of the ideas of multiculturalism and that of the State.

3.2.   Opposition of Multiculturalism to the Idea of State

That multiculturalism is opposed to the idea of state implies that the state is in its conception (idea) something to which multiculturalism in its conception too is opposed. The understanding of this claim therefore implies an analysis of the concepts of State and multiculturalism. We mean by concept what remains when one has removed all particularities to many objects of analysis. This means, if we analyse for instance what Gabonese, Nigerians and Cameroonians mean by State, that the concept of State is what will

remain unchanged from these various analyses (Cf. Annas, 2003: 83 and following). To begin with the analysis of the concept of State, consider the following definitions of a State given by Aristotle, Rousseau and Bluntschli:

Aristotle says:

> Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. (Aristotle, 2007:2022)

Rousseau says:

> For with regard to its members, the state is master of all their goods in virtue of the social contract, which serves in the state as the basis of all rights. (Rousseau, 1987:151)

Bluntschli says:

> First, it is clear that in every State a number of men are combined. In particular States the number may be very different, some embracing only a few thousands, others many millions; but, nevertheless, we cannot talk of a State until we get beyond the circle of a single family, and until a multitude of men (i.e., families, men, women and children) are united together. (Bluntschli, 2000:22)

Aristotle says community, Rousseau says all and Bluntschli says combined. The definition of the state that can be derived is then the following: a state is a community where all men and their goods are combined.

Now consider the following definitions of multiculturalism given by Taylor, Kymlicka, and Modood:

Taylor says:

> And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today's politics, on behalf of minority or "subaltern" groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of "multiculturalism." (Taylor In Gutmann, 1994:25)

Kymlicka says:

> To resolve these questions fairly, we need to supplement traditional human rights principles with a theory of minority rights [that is Multiculturalism]. (Kymlicka, 1995:5)

Modood says:

> The political idea of multiculturalism [is] – the recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of shared citizenship and national identity –(Modood, 2013:2)

Taylor says "minority or 'subaltern' groups," Kymlicka says "minority rights," and Modood says "group difference." From there, what remains in multiculturalism is the insistence on multiplicity and differences rather than unity. One might claim that we distort the argument of the above multiculturalists in order to neutralize them easily. The answer at this level is that what matters here is the organization of priorities. As we have said before, what really comes first and is natural is the difference, but what matters for a State to exist, is the 'after' difference. What multiculturalism unfortunately does is to remain at the first level of analysis. This, however, does not mean that the second level of analysis vacates the first level; from the first level to the second, there is not evacuation but conservation.

From the analyses of both concepts it follows that the concepts of State and Multiculturalism are not coherent. If two ideas are not coherent, they do not go together. Things that do not go together may nonetheless be reconciled if they look alike to a certain extent. But if these things look in very opposite directions, bringing them together may lead to confusion or cause more pain. In other words, bringing State and multiculturalism is possible only if the differences between both are slight. But actually, they are not. If this is proved –that is not yet the case-, forcing multiculturalism will finally lead to the fragmentation of the Country. One might consider Spinoza's following comment in the Ethics as proving the contrary of what we are saying. Spinoza says:

> It follows that the thing extended and the thing thinking are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God. (Ethics, part I, Proposition 14, Corollary 2).

then:

> For that which is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from its cause. (Ibid., part I, Proposition 17, Scholium).

The argument can be put as follows:
The ideas of Unity and that of multiplicity are very coherent. For instance, if things are extended or thinking, then there are attributes of God, for if one admits that something is caused, he must also admit that what is caused is caused by something else. Yet God is unique, and human beings are many. Though they are many creatures, the idea of multiplicity and that of unity are coherent since the multiple (creatures) is only an attribute of God.

Though one might consider this objection as convincing, our counter-objection to it is the following. In Spinoza, creatures are modes of God's attributes; they have never been posited as essentially different from him. Then, though these ideas are coherent when applied to God and its creatures, they are not when applied to things that are said to be essentially different, the individuals and groups (human beings) and the State (a contingent reality). Indeed, though we have claimed earlier that differences are not essential, this view is not shared by multiculturalist: either you are what you are and remain what you are, or you become someone else, and you disappear. This leads unavoidably to poor management of differences by multicultural policies.

Now, let's be more concrete and take an example.

3.3. The example of Cameroon

Though Cameroon has suffered demands from groups for their recognition as a minority and recently put in place a commission for the promotion of multiculturalism, there seems to be an agreement that the unity of the country should be the main focus of the government. The promotion of minority rights is still a problem in Cameroon. One seems to see a will from citizens to go further in the process of making things have a certain common base. Just to take some few domains, one can be attentive to the following expectations of citizens:

Firstly at the linguistic level, the will seems to be to see different parts of Cameroon moving on the same speed rather than moving with the Francophone speed and the Anglophone speed (Verkijika, 1999), the will to have full bilingual Cameroonians, speaking English and French rather than Cameroonians speaking either English or French.

Secondly in the domain of education, the existence of different educational systems incarnated by the Office du Baccalauréat du Cameroun (OBC) and the General Certificate of Education (GCE) board lack harmonization and gives the feeling of training two different types of Cameroonians (Ngalim, 2014).

Thirdly at the level of justice, proponents of meritocracy seem to be louder than those of positive discrimination. The last case date is that of the results of the entrance to IRIC 2015 where the first list of successful candidates had been rejected for its non-representative nature and then reconsidered.

Lastly, as far as the issue of values is concerned, everyone seems to conform to the ideal of peace promoted in the country. This justifies the mobilization against the terrorists of Boko Haram.

It follows from what we have just said that it is considered a necessity to bring groups together if we want to sustain the unity of our country. What remains is the type of education that will help to achieve this goal. This can only be done through an open-based education as we will prove in the remainder of this paper.

4. BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM OR THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING GROUPS TOGETHER THROUGH AN OPEN-BASED EDUCATION

4.1. Four Reasons for Bringing Groups Together in Class

In the domain of education, understanding the importance of communication between groups is central for at least four reasons.

Firstly, the notion of mono-ethnic school cannot practically be established. All schools and learners in the classroom will be different the ones from the others. Social mobility or other causes will unavoidably bring 'strangers' who are in need of integration. This means that the teacher should be attentive to these differences and to the possible influences cultural backgrounds might have on students' understanding.

Secondly, a teacher should understand that the recognition of differences is not the main aim of education. He should understand the type of citizens the nation intends to build. If integration is really the desire of our national policy of education, it means that the teacher must bring, as much possible, students to crossroads. Interculturalism tries to build intercultural citizens; students whose final target is the sharing of national rather than group values (Alred et al., 2006).

Thirdly, it is an expectation from learners themselves not to see their classmates only as coming from this or that part of the country or as having that particular background. They expect the teacher to treat them as learners and not to emphasize the advantages that must be granted to this or that group for its lateness, laziness or whatsoever. Cultural differences among learners do not really matter, especially when they are still at the low age. Differences are created by the society and are mostly based on biases many have developed, especially the bias that learning from others is synonymous with assimilation.

Lastly, cultural groups are themselves dynamic. In this line, the teacher should not himself be resistant to change. It is only if he portrays acceptance of differences and goes beyond to express what binds people that he will really show the example to his students. This implies that the teacher must absolutely avoid cultural reinforcement that might give an impression of superiority or inferiority to students with regard to others. This opened education might even serve, as we shall see below, as a remedy to terrorism we are now facing.

4.2.   Responding to Terrorism through Education

4.2.1.   The Genesis of Terrorism

To understand the meaning of terrorism, one has to consider various forms of terrorism and see what remains when we have removed that which differentiates them. Taken in its common forms, terrorism is either political, cultural or religious.

By political terrorism we understand the imposition of fear on people within a political community, having a matter of contention political matters such as political ideology and values to be promoted. This can be done either by the ruler, the people itself or another State. When this is done by a ruler, it is called dictatorship, by the people itself it is called a civil war, and by another country, it is called imperialism or annexation.

By cultural terrorism we mean the fear imposed upon a cultural group by another cultural group, with group values or worldview as matters of contention. This is mostly presented as an ethnic conflict where people are afraid of being from this or from that ethnic group because of the atrocities inflicted upon the given ethnic group. We witnessed this type of terrorism in Rwanda in 1994 and earlier, around the 40s with Hitler.

By religious terrorism, we mean what we have already said of cultural terrorism except that matters of contention are religious values. This is the kind of terrorism we witness nowadays with groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State.

From the comparison of all these forms of terrorism, what remains is the imposition of fear, which in its paroxysmal form is called terror. The will to impose fear upon somebody comes either from the fact that the dictator has been frustrated in the past –this concerns political terrorism- or from the misunderstanding of other groups' values by others.

No matter the form we are referring to, terrorism is always related to education and solutions to it comes from education. It is from the type of education the child has received at home, in school or in the society that frustrations arise and finally give the dictator to be. It is from the type of education one receives that he considers this value as proper and that other value as improper, that he considers this person as primitive or that people as civilized. Arguing in this line, Russell says:

> The power of education in forming character and opinion is very great and very generally recognized. The genuine beliefs, though not usually the professed precepts, of parents and teachers are almost unconsciously acquired by most children; and even if they depart from these beliefs in

later life, something of them remains deeply implanted, ready to emerge in a time of stress or crisis. (Russell, 2009: 379)

That terrorism originates from frustrations proper to the type of education a person, a group or a country receives is now précised. What is still to be showed is how we can fight terrorism through education.

4.2.2.   How we should Educate People

Truths and goods, as well as values, are not equal (Aristotle, 2002). The reason why people think we are allowed to do everything and affirm any value in the public sphere comes from their thinking that all values are equal. But to say that all values are equal is the same as saying that all actions tend to the same purpose. The value of love and the value of hatred lead for the first to the unity of people and for the second to the division of people. Since their ends are not the same, love and hatred are not the same and should not be given equal value. The same, showing to people that those who do not share their religious or cultural values should be killed is certainly less worthy advice than to show that they can tolerate them. However, extreme toleration can also lead to relativism. To avoid such a relativism, one has to build a type of education corresponding to our desire of remaining together. What kind of education should it be?

This kind of education is that which is necessarily opened. The necessity of openness in education is justified by the danger of maintaining solely specific truths. Specific truths close the mind and make it think to the extraordinary of its beliefs. It also blinds people and makes them believe 'sheepily' to what they are initiated. Specific truths should, therefore, be associated with general truths, building values or educational contents that can surpass differences and at the same time not wipe them. But this too can lead to extreme toleration. Thence it follows that the type of education we should follow to be able to be exposed to many views and at the same time rationally reject some of them must be philosophical. To sustain this view, Russell maintains:

> Nations have been brought to ruin much more often by insistence upon a narrow-minded doctrinal uniformity than by free discussion and the toleration of divergent opinions. Dogmatists in the world over believe that although the truth is known to them, others will be led to false beliefs provided they are allowed to hear the arguments on both sides. This is a view which leads to one or another of two misfortunes: either one set of dogmatists conquers the world and prohibits all new ideas, or, what is worse, rival dogmatists conquer different regions and preach the gospel of hate against each other, the former of these evils existing in the middle ages, the latter during the wars of religion, and again in the present day. The first makes civilization static; the second tends to destroy it completely. Against both, the teacher should be the main safeguard. (Russell, 2009:416)

Since many have doubted and still doubt the importance of philosophy, they might develop a sort of resistance to what we have called philosophical education. The question we have to answer then is: what do we mean by philosophical education?

Many people have a mistaken idea of philosophy. Often compared to practical sciences and technologies, philosophy is said to be a reflexion on non-important matters, matters that do not interest anybody. Karl Marx had fathered this view in his 11th thesis on Feuerbach when he affirmed that Philosophers have only been interpreting the world while that which matters is its transformation. This view is largely rooted, to our opinion, on a misconception of the aim of philosophy.

We have to precise here that the introduction of philosophy in education will create openness and understanding of others. Russell has justly pointed this out when discussing the functions of the teacher he affirms:

> He should see his own country not only as a home but as one among the countries of the world, all with an equal right to live and think and feel. He should see his own age in relation to the past and the future, and be aware that its own controversies will seem as strange to future ages as those of the past seem to us now. Taking an even wider view, he should be conscious of the vastness of geological epochs and astronomical abysses; but he should be aware of all this, not as a weight to crush the individual human spirit, but as a vast panorama which enlarges the mind that contemplates it. (Ibid.:417)

This is to say that philosophy leaves the room for choice. As Aristotle once remarked, you are as much philosopher as you know the first principles (Cf. Aristotle, 2002)

Many have derived from there that philosophy serves to nothing –since 'first principles seem nothing but abstract entities that have nothing to do with concrete reality- and therefore that one has no reason to learn them. But they obviously misunderstand this formula. This is the conclusion, in our personal opinion, one should draw:

Philosophy is the knowledge of the first principles, the basic laws governing human understanding, by which a man stands and walks indefinitely on the road called life.

This definition suggests that philosophy is only at the basis of something to be done later, it is a propaedeutic, something that serves as a preparation for greater achievements. Granted this, one should not be surprised that all ancient philosophers always did something in which philosophical principles they had to learn could be applied. Aristotle was chief in Biology and politic counselor, Kant thought mathematics and physics and Jaspers was a psychologist. In this line, a philosophical education is not the absolute study of philosophy; it is the study of the philosophical way of seeing things, beginning with the view that there is no absolute view and that if a view is to be chosen, it is with regard to the good reasons given for its choice. A philosophical education warrants for openness and the building of strong basis for what follows.

CONCLUSION

The main question we have been busy with this paper was that of knowing whether arguments for multiculturalism are sustainable enough. After having described multiculturalism and present two of its main arguments, we have extensively shown that it could only survive through the fragmentation of the State. However, despite our critique of multiculturalism, the final goal has been to propose a way of fostering the unity of the State. This, as we have proved, can only be done through a philosophical education of citizens, that is an open-based education, based on sharing of values, learning from others and understanding of the dynamic character of cultures.

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